philosophy
Asghar Vaezi; Hussein Niazbakhsh
Abstract
IntroductionIbn Gabirol (a Jewish philosopher of the 11th century CE) enumerates different divisions for the concept of "being" in his book, “Fons Vitae". At first glance, some of these divisions seem incompatible with each other. Based on the findings of this research, Ibn Gabirol considers “being” ...
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IntroductionIbn Gabirol (a Jewish philosopher of the 11th century CE) enumerates different divisions for the concept of "being" in his book, “Fons Vitae". At first glance, some of these divisions seem incompatible with each other. Based on the findings of this research, Ibn Gabirol considers “being” to be equivalent to “unity”. By focusing on this concept, different divisions of being can be reconciled. God (Unity the Creator) is at the head of the hierarchy of beings and after that, there is “what is possible” (unity the created). Every “possible” is made up of two beings: matter and form. According to Ibn Gabirol, the form is the same as unity, but matter (material being) is neither unity nor plurality, although it can be the subject and sustainer of unity and plurality.Research Question(s)Ibn Gabirol has several different interpretations of the meaning of “being” and its types. On the one hand, he attributes “being” to God or “First Essence”, and on the other hand, he attributes it to “universal matter” and “universal form” and not God. The Jewish philosopher, also, has different interpretations about the value of “being” and its meaning. But how can these different interpretations and statements be united? Is it possible to achieve a coherent philosophy from Ibn Gabirol's ontology? Literature ReviewThe issue of "being" in the philosophy of Ibn Gabirol is not raised by the commentators of this philosopher and his book, “Fons Vitae”. Most of the commentators have not tried to specify the type of being of matter and determine its relation to the “universal form” and “First Essence”. It is only “Sarah Pessin” who has tried to determine the place of matter and explain the ontology of Ibn Gabirol in her book: "Theology of Desire". But she has abandoned the duality of matter and form and has considered “universal matter” to be higher and more valuable than form, and this is exactly what is not consistent with Ibn Gabirol's philosophy and the text of “Fons Vitae”. MethodologyThis article’s method is "structural textualism". In this method, some internal contradictions of a specific text are considered and only based on the text and its content and rules, and without considering external assumptions, it is tried to dissolve the contradictions or solve the problems. ResultsIn Ibn Gabirol's ontological system, “matter” has a special place and cannot be compared with Ibn Sina's "quiddity" (Mahiyat). According to Ibn Gabirol, universal matter and universal form are equal and none is superior to the other. Only God is the source and creator of both and for this reason, God is above them. This point of view is opposed to the dominant view of the Platonic philosophers (such as Muslims, Jews, Christians, and even pagans) who consider matter as the source of ambiguity and change, and sometimes equal to privation. Ibn Gabirol has a different view of “matter” and believes that matter has the highest ontological rank after God and is more valuable (dignior) than all beings in the world (from Intelligence to Soul, Nature, etc.). Discussion The foundation of the coherence of the Jewish philosopher's ontology and the relationship between the types of being is the concept of "unity". The statement "being is unity" is the fundamental statement of Ibn Gabirol's ontology. Unity the Creator or God, which is "one", is the unity that is self-sufficient and has inherent consistency. This pure unity emanates its unity to the world. This emanated unity (unity the created) is called “universal form”. But the emanated unity is not self-sufficient and needs a sustainer, which is a “universal matter”. Matter in itself is neither unity nor multiplicity, but the origin of the realization of unity and multiplicity, and for this reason, it is related to unity. All beings in the universe can be analyzed into matter and form. God is "one" or unity that is self-sufficient and is the origin of all numbers or beings. From this self-sufficient being, another “one” is created, which is conjunct with matter. This substance causes the multiplication of this secondary unity and makes different numbers which are created from "one". Therefore, the only beings that have real existence are:The first essence (unity the creator and self-sufficient)universal form (unity the created and non-self-sufficient)universal matter (the sustainer of form).The “First Essence”, which is “pure unity”, is called “absolute being” (esse tantum). The universal form and universal matter are called universal beings (esse universalis) and all other entities that are reduced to matter and form are called beings (esse). The relationship between matter and being is as paradoxical and ambiguous as the relationship between matter and unity. Matter is not the substance of unity, but is the sustainer of unity, and for this reason, it is indirectly called “unity”. In the same way, matter is called “being” because of its connection with being. ConclusionThe concept which is able to solve the problem of “being” in Ibn Gabirol's philosophy is “unity". Just as all beings are numbers and numbers are all created from the repetition of “one”, beings are also the result of the repetition of “being” and finally reduced to universal matter and form and the first essence.
Mehdi Mohammadi; Asghar Vaezi
Abstract
Tabatabai and Motahari consider Sadra's philosophy to be a realistic philosophy and claim a kind of realism in the book "Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism". Ilham Dilman also believes that Wittgenstein's rejection of realism does not make him an idealist. Rather, Wittgenstein is also ...
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Tabatabai and Motahari consider Sadra's philosophy to be a realistic philosophy and claim a kind of realism in the book "Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism". Ilham Dilman also believes that Wittgenstein's rejection of realism does not make him an idealist. Rather, Wittgenstein is also considered a realist in a sense. This article examines and compares the realism proposed in "Principles..." on the one hand and the realism that Dillman attributes to Wittgenstein on the other hand.
